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SUMMARY 
Sub-Saharan Africa is trapped in a complex unsustainability spiral with demographic, biophysical, 
technical and socio-political dimensions. Unravelling the spiral is vital to perceive which policy 
actions are needed to reverse it and initiate sustainable pro-poor growth. The article presents an 
evolutionary, multi-agent modelling framework that marries a socio-ecological approach to a world 
system perspective and takes agriculture as the engine for sustainable development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A number of possibilities for empirical validation are proposed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For three decades, Sub-Saharan Africa has been trapped in economic stagnation, coupled to 
pathologies like widespread poverty, child malnutrition, violent conflict and the HIV-Aids 
epidemic. That a new boom of the world economy now entails somewhat higher growth rates 
does not alter the fact that per capita GDPs have hardly increased since the 1980s in Africa 
below the Sahara. 
Today, it is once more recognized that this stagnation is rooted in agricultural crisis. Both the 
World Bank and scientists [1, 2] already stressed that modern growth requires agricultural 
development as a starter, but many believed that “globalization” would allow export demand 
for manufactures or services to assume this role. The absence of cases of successful 
development without agricultural growth has belied this view (cf. [3]). In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, agricultural crisis caused a flight from the land, but no incentives for non-farm 
development, so that urbanization entailed a proliferation of marginal activities and fights 
over public sector jobs. 
Why is agriculture stagnating? For a long time, experts forwarded mono-causal explanations. 
They pointed to adverse natural conditions (e.g. [4]), high population growth (e.g. [5]), 
overtaxation of farmers [6], and so on. When donor prescriptions to redress some of these 
conditions failed, a new mono-causal bogey was looked for. The blame was put on “bad 
governance” and “social capital problems” that would stem from Africa’s particular culture 
and history [7-9]. 
Gradually, some experts came to realize that Africa’s problems had multiple and mutually 
reinforcing drivers rather than single causes. Various vicious cycles or ‘poverty traps’ were 
identified: of poverty, population growth and soil degradation [10]; of poverty and low public 
investment [11]; of thin markets and low private investment in agro-industrial chains [12]; of 
dependence on traditional commodities and low export earnings [13], and so on and so forth. 
All these explanations are right, but each lifts only one corner of the veil. In fact, Sub-
Saharan Africa is trapped in a complex unsustainability spiral with demographic, biophysical, 
technical and socio-political dimensions. Unravelling it is vital to perceive which social 
actions could reverse this spiral and initiate a positive dynamic of sustainable pro-poor growth. 
In our opinion, such unravelling requires an evolutionary framework that marries a socio-
ecological approach to a world system perspective. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region that has 
retained certain pre-industrial traits, with consequences for its internal dynamics, but that is 
integrated in an industrialized world economy which makes its dynamics deviate from pre-
Industrial Revolution societies. This paper sketches a broad vision that is based on this 
premise, and proposes a computer model that can serve to elaborate it, test its consistency, 
and explore ramifications. At the end we discuss possibilities for empirical validation. 
VISION 
In pre-industrial societies, centuries of demo-economic growth alternated with Malthusian 
crises [14, 15] (for theoretical interpretation [16]). Central to it was Ricardo’s classical “law” 
that farm production could only be raised by reclaiming less fertile lands or labour-
demanding intensification, so that population upswings raised agricultural prices [17]. It 
made food dear for the poor, but as Malthus [18, pp.29-31] already observed, it lowered real 
wages and prompted investment and innovation in larger farms (also [19]). This fuelled the 
phases of agricultural intensification that historians have called ‘agricultural revolutions’. The 
resulting increases in food supply moderated the rise in food prices. More mouths could be G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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fed, rural markets for commerce and industry expanded, and no severe distress precluded co-
operation and the maintaining of soil fertility. In these phases the farm economy was more or 
less robust; harvest failures caused suffering but no collapse. However, risk aversion and 
time-consuming communication made innovation a slow process [20]. Sooner or later, 
agricultural growth ran up against diminishing returns. For some time, a precarious stability 
could be maintained by elaborate safety nets, intricate social hierarchies, and small technical 
improvements (cf. [21]), but in the end, strong increases in scarcity could not be avoided. 
Food prices skyrocketed, squeezing the demand for non-farm products; artisans lost their 
livelihoods swelling the ranks of the rural poor and small farmers over-exploited their plots in 
an effort to minimise their dependence on food markets (cf. [22]). Harvest failures or other 
shocks pushed society into a spiral of interlocking vicious cycles of soil degradation, food 
insecurity, rising conflict and disruption, which ended in demographic crisis. This 
“Malthusian correction” released the pressure of population on the food supply. Wages rose 
and farm prices fell, causing a decline in large farms and halting or reversing the process of 
intensification. It initiated a low tide in economic development, which lasted until a new 
population upswing prompted a new cycle. 
In the late 19th century, a new phase of the Industrial Revolution broke the Ricardian 
constraints [23]. Modern transport enabled the tapping of land reserves in temperate zones 
outside Europe; industrial fertiliser accelerated the increase in yields; and fossil substitutes 
freed farm production capacity that had been used for non-foods. For the first time in history, 
international agricultural prices went through a series of price falls without this being caused 
by a crisis in population. It ended the age-old problem of scarcity, but at the same time it 
brought a new challenge. Low prices squeezed farm profits which entailed a decline of large 
farms and threatened to slow agricultural growth. Western countries responded through 
government support and co-operatives that bolstered knowledge infrastructures, moderated 
the diseconomies of small farms, and ensured that frugal household producers kept margins 
for investment [24]. Rather than leaving a sector with low earnings, farm families seized 
upon the new technical and market opportunities to defend their incomes. It started a 
treadmill of production growth, low prices and new innovations [25] that became the engine 
of a new agricultural revolution of agri-chemicals, high-yielding varieties and mechanization. 
The regime change that emanated from the ‘western’ world deeply affected other countries 
too. The impacts varied depending on local conditions. East and South Asia had gone through 
a long history of population growth, state formation, class differentiation and market 
development. Farmers tended to organize on class basis, and a political class had emerged 
with some feeling for long-term national interests. It stimulated ‘developmental states’ (cf. [26]) 
that followed the western response at some distance. The Japanese Empire invested in 
irrigation and rural infrastructure and protected its farmers at the outer border. It enabled 
significant agricultural growth, which after WWII got a new impulse by redistributive land 
reform and US aid [27]. Rural incomes became an important demand factor for industries that 
produced simple goods for domestic consumption. It facilitated the cross-subsidization of 
industrial exports by which these countries established themselves as industrial powers. 
Meanwhile in Asian colonies of European countries farmers were not supported. Population 
increased, but low world market prices discouraged the farmer investment in land 
management that was needed for sustainable intensification. Rural societies were pushed in 
vicious spirals of poverty, population growth and resource degradation that suffocated 
economic development [21, 28]. It reminded of pre-industrial Malthusian crises, but these 
occurred because an agricultural revolution was exhausted, while here an agricultural 
revolution was nipped in the bud. However, independence was a historical watershed. Several 
new governments introduced supportive farm policies [29-32]. Together with the high-Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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yielding seeds from international research institutions it led to the Green Revolution, which 
became an engine of industrialization. 
In the Americas, pre-Columbian Stone Age societies had been overrun by European invaders 
with superior weapons and diseases for which they had no immunity [33, 34]. In the 
(sub)tropical parts, where profitable export crops could be grown for the European market, 
large plantations evolved that employed coercive labour systems to prevent workers from 
using the abundance of land and setting themselves up as independent peasants. It created a 
social divide between planter elites and rightless masses of rural workers, which encouraged 
‘oligarchic’ political structures, hampered the development of simple consumer goods 
industries, and reinforced the export orientation of the plantations [35, 36]. When international 
agricultural prices fell, agrarian elites kept to open trade policies. Rather than calling for 
protection, they used their dominance to shift the burden to the rural poor. In the end, they 
evicted large numbers of rural workers to pave the way for cost-cutting mechanization. It 
allowed a development of a kind, but one that involved more inequality, slower growth and 
more socio-political tensions than in the West or the industrializing Asian countries [37, 38]. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, endemic diseases and iron-armed warriors postponed the colonial 
scramble until the time that international agricultural prices declined. It limited the establishment 
of European-owned farms and plantations, as well as the evolution of larger indigenous 
farms. Africa's agriculture became even more a smallholder agriculture than it already was. 
Like in Asia, colonial governments failed to protect indigenous smallholder farmers, and 
signs of Malthusian crisis appeared where land had been confiscated for white settlers [39-41]. 
Elsewhere, however, relative abundance of land provided an outlet for population growth. In 
the 1960s, per capita incomes in Sub-Sahara Africa were still higher than in Southern Asia. 
However, national independence brought no real breach with colonial farm policies. 
Sub-Saharan African societies were little differentiated, had property rights in people rather 
than material assets, and had more fluid and personalist socio-political relations [42, 43]. 
People tended to organize in clientelist factions rather than in class-based movements. 
Politicians saw themselves obliged to remunerate large numbers of supporters with public 
sector jobs, while farmers were too weakly organized to prevent footing the bill [6, 44]. 
Meanwhile, population growth was closing the safety valve that abundant land had provided. 
The effect was felt when oil shocks and a new fall of international agricultural prices 
deteriorated the input-output price ratios for farmers. On-farm investment in land management 
remained too small to make the increase in population pressure sustainable [45]. The resulting 
poverty pushed individual discount rates up. It reduced the value that people attached to the 
future benefits of soil conservation or cooperative solutions for social dilemmas. Intra- and 
inter-household conflicts increased [46], and civil society in the countryside degenerated into 
counter-democratic networking [47]. The malaise drove many young people from the land, 
but squeezed the demand for domestic industries and services, so that the rural exodus fuelled 
political markets that were based on the doling out of public sector jobs. Civic organizations 
became vehicles of competing migrant networks [48]. The burden of civil servants’ salaries 
was shifted to farmers and squeezed investment in rural infrastructure, which only deepened 
the agricultural crisis [49]. Donor-imposed reform sought to roll back the bureaucracies, but 
the dominance of free market ideas obscured the underlying dynamics that made supportive 
policies (including price policies) a sine qua non for development. Failing to redress the root 
cause of the agrarian crisis, the reforms went not further than the liberalization of macro-
policies, and foundered on the resistance to public sector retrenchment. 
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APPROACH: MODELLING 
To elaborate this vision, test its consistency, and explore ramifications, we need a model that 
can handle the co-evolution of population, natural resources, techniques and social 
strategizing at local, regional and global scales. Although computer modelling is praised an 
important tool in understanding complex, long term phenomena and assessing policy 
instruments [50], traditional economic or ecological models are ill-suited for our study. 
However, we think that a spatial specific multi-agent model can be used for this purpose. 
Such a model provides a flexible structure [51] that can represent interactions between 
phenomena that belong to different layers and scales of reality [52], and that are at the focus 
of different disciplines [53, 54]. It also allows for the internal representation and goal-seeking 
behaviour that characterizes human actors, without falling in assumptions of perfect 
information and rationality of orthodox economic models [53]. 
There is a current tendency towards spatially explicit, highly sophisticated models that try 
make concrete a one to one simulation of reality (examples PALM [55]), but our model is 
abstract and theoretical like the FEARLUS model [56] and the early contributions to agent 
based modelling (e.g. [57]). We use CORMAS software for building our multi-agent model. 
There are important challenges in agent based modelling: the first is they demand much 
computer power. Second, agent based models are difficult to test and validate [58]. A later 
section of this paper, therefore, is dedicated to new methods for testing and validating the 
model assumptions. A third drawback is that the details of agent based models are difficult to 
describe and communicate [59]. To tackle this point we will use a widely tested protocol for 
describing our model [59]. 
THE MODEL: DESCRIPTION 
The model description follows the ODD (Overviews, Design Concepts and Details) protocol 
for describing individual and agent based models [59] and consists of seven elements. The 
first three elements provide an overview, the fourth element explains general concepts 
underlying the model’s design, and the remaining three elements provide details. The last 
element, containing an overview of the calculations and procedures in the models’ 
sub-modules, is provided in the appendix. 
PURPOSE 
The main purpose of the model is to gain insight in the long-term agricultural and 
environmental changes of Sub-Saharan Africa, based on the hypothesis that Africa operates 
as a pre-industrial society in an industrialized world economy. This insight is needed to 
unravel the current unsustainability spiral in order to provide policy recommendations. The 
unsustainability spiral has many dimensions and multiple scales. The model will serve as a 
discussion support tool for the Dutch Directorate General for Development Cooperation 
(DGIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
STATE VARIABLES AND SCALES 
Grimm [59] defines state variables as low-level variables that characterize the low-level 
entities of the model. State variables are variables that characterize a level and cannot be 
derived from other variables. However defining which variables are state variables is not 
unambiguous in a system containing many feedbacks. Our model comprises the following 5 
levels or entities without a clear hierarchy: 1) brain, 2) teams, 3) villages, 4) area, and 5) the 
world market. The relations between the levels are described further on. Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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Figure 1. Overview of levels and subsequent state variables. 
The first entity of the model is the brain which is characterized by the village that holds it. 
The brain contains a list of technologies that are available to the holder, and a list of its conflict 
history. A brain can invent, imitate and forget production technologies. The technologies a 
brain knows are an element of a big list of technologies, which is an input variable. 
Villages (groups) form the second entity. They are the Sub-Saharan farmer villages which are 
characterized by the state variables: population, the characteristics of the area they occupy, 
the list of other villages they know (their social network), their brains, teams, capital, and 
discount rate. Instead of discount rate, nutrition status can also be used as a state variable, 
because the one is derived from the other. One of the villages is set to be the ‘port’. By 
trading with the port the villages can trade with the world market. In the remainder of the 
article villages are sometimes called individuals or agents. 
The third entity, teams, consists of migrant workers sent by one village to another village to 
work. The teams are characterised by their village of origin, the buyers of their labour, their 
size and piece rate. 
Areas are the fourth entity of the model. Areas are characterized by the village which 
occupies it: the location on the grid, the migrant workers sent to work on it and the land 
quality. The latter is a lump variable representing all aspects of land quality, like a.o.: organic 
matter and nutrient content, texture and water availability. An area is always occupied by a 
village. For modelling purposes villages are not allowed to starve entirely. G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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The fifth hierarchical level is the world market which can be accessed by thE villages via the 
port. The characteristic state variable of the world market is the world market price which is 
the price per unit of labour (piece rate) sold by the villages to the port. 
Spatial scale is abstract but can be considered an area of 400 by 400 kilometres. This will be 
occupied by around 10 000 villages or villages with an average population of 100 people 
corresponding with an average population pressure of 6,25 per square kilometre. This is a 
normal density in rural Sub-Sahara Africa (mostly between 5 and 10 per km, although it is 
much higher in urban and ore densely populated areas. The average population density of 
Sub-Sahara Africa, including the cities, is about 30 [60]. 
Table 1. Overview of parameters of the unsustainability spiral model. 
Overview of parameters per module  Value* (Unit) 
Initialization   
Number of areas  10000 (#) 
Number of villages  10000(#) 
Neighbours of each cell  8 (#) 
Initial land Quality  (food) 
Initial local list of technologies represented by Cobb Douglas 
Coefficients  
Population Dynamics   
Minimum mortality  (people/people) 
Food intake per caput at which mortality does not further decrease  (food/people) 
Food intake per caput at which fertility is zero  (food/people) 
Food intake per caput at which fertility does not further increase  (food/people) 
Evolution of knowledge   
Time after which a technology becomes forgotten  (time steps) 
Threshold to experimenting  (food) 
Global list of technologies represented by Cobb Douglas coefficients   
Evolution of cooperation strategy   
Time that a conflict is remembered  (years) 
Plan production, trade and robberies   
World market price  (food) 
Labour intensity  1 (labour/people) 
Amount of food that is robbed during robbery  equals wage (food) 
Transaction costs after robbery  (food/labour) 
Distance to transaction costs coefficient  (food/meter) 
Risk aversion threshold when accepting trade  (change) 
Evolve agro-ecology   
Value at which land regenerates each time step  (food) 
Rate at which land degradation takes place (food production minus 
conservation investment)  (food/food) 
Conservation efficiency  (food/food) 
Minimum land quality  (food) 
Maximum land quality  (food) 
Regeneration per time step  (food) 
Spend harvest   
Capital Access coefficient  (food/food) 
*if values are not yet determined, units are provided Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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PROCESS OVERVIEW AND SCHEDULING 
Each time step is a cropping season, which can be considered a year. Each time step five 
modules are processed in the following order: evolve demography, evolve knowledge, plan 
production and evolve cooperation, evolve agro-ecology and spend production. Details about 
the procedures and calculations within these modules are provided in the appendix. 
The ‘Evolve demography’ module consists of the submodules birth and death. The ‘Evolve 
knowledge’ module consists of the submodules: forget production technology, imitate from 
villages and experiment, which are processed in the given order. Subsequently, villages make 
their decisions on production and trade in the ‘Plan production and evolve cooperation’ module 
which consists of three submodules which are processed in the following order: consider 
agricultural production, consider trading with other villages, and allocate the inputs. Once the 
decisions on production have been made the module ‘Evolve agro-ecology’ calculates the 
crop-growth in the submodule ‘Grow crop’ and changes ‘Land quality’ in the submodule 
‘Evolve land quality’. When the crop production is realised, the ‘Spend production’ module 
is run, which consists of a submodule that determines the capital input for the next year and a 
module that calculates next year’s discount rate. Finally, the village evolves its cooperation 
strategy, based on the conflicts in its social environment and its relative wellbeing. 
Within each submodule the villages or areas are processed in a fixed order except when trade 
is considered. During the ‘Consider trading’ phase, the trade possibilities of a village and its 
partner are assessed at the same time. 
DESIGN CONCEPTS 
The design concepts section describes the general concepts underlying the design of the 
model along with concepts that are common in the field of Complex Adaptive Systems [61, 62] 
and facilitate the integration of this study into others. 
Emergence 
A certain system property or behaviour is emergent if it is not directly specified by individual 
traits. Here we will explain which properties of the model system really emerge from the 
interaction of the adaptive behaviour of the agents, and which are merely imposed. Here we 
differ between rather linear dependence between factors and the emergence of macro level 
phenomena that not linearly follow from the procedures at micro scale. First, we will deal 
with the first category and then describe the expected emergence of macro scale properties. 
Population, capital, land quality, technology, conflict history and the discount rate are the 
main driving variables of the model. None of these variables, however, are imposed but are 
derived from each other. 
Births and deaths and the subsequent population dynamics depend on a village’s nutritional 
status. The nutritional status emerges from all main driving forces listed above. Capital 
emerges from the current and expected income status and the discount rate. The discount rate 
is derived from the previous nutritional status, while the income status emerges from the 
main driving variables. Land quality depends on degradation, regeneration, and conservation 
investments. Degradation occurs in a fixed relation with yield (again emerging from the main 
variables). Regeneration is imposed and conservation investments depend on the main 
driving variables. Known technology is a product of imitating, experimenting and forgetting. 
All those are dependent on other changes in the environment. However the global list of 
technologies is imposed, limiting freedom in technological innovation. Conflicts are also 
dependent on changes in the main variables. G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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What is imposed is the way in which the villages make their decisions, which is based on 
household economics (see also fitness section). Furthermore, the social networks of the 
villages are imposed; the position of a village is also imposed and cannot change during the 
model. Other imposed parameters are shown in Table. 
We expect the following emerging patterns at macro scale. In case the model is run without a 
port to the world market and hence a pre-industrial society is simulated we expect a sinus like 
wave pattern in which the up-going phase, or the Boserup phase is characterized by 
synergetic interaction of land quality improvement, technological progress and cooperation 
driven by a relative abundance of food and a consequent favourable discount rate. 
 
 
Figure 2. Overview of feedbacks that trigger growth of an agrarian market economy (left) and 
feedbacks that trigger a crisis in an agrarian market economy [63]. Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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The downward or Malthusian phase is characterized by resource depletion, a technological 
standstill and conflicts that are triggered by a high discount rate which is caused by 
overpopulation. In case this pre-industrial society is connected to the world market with low 
food prices, poor villages send their labourers to the port, because the food to labour ratio is 
favourable. Rich villages, consequently, will run out of labour and this labour stress will 
reduce technological innovations and investments in soil quality. As a result land degradation 
and a technological standstill will cause stagnation in farm production, without an increase in 
agricultural prices. Therefore the system will find itself in a loop of impoverishment and the 
unsustainability spiral emerges [63]. 
The first sociological multi-agent models focussed on describing the emergence and 
dynamics of norms and values in society is found in [57]. Some of these notions are planned 
to be included in the model in a later stage. 
Welfare maximizing behaviour 
In our model the goal of the villages is to maximise welfare, which we operationalize as 
utility. Utility is maximized using a farm household economics utility optimising procedure 
based on Cobb Douglas production functions for current and future income and leisure time. 
Villages try to increase their long and short-term utility by making choices on investment in 
land quality and allocation of food and labour for on-farm production, hiring or hiring out 
labour and robbing. 
We model goal seeking at village level and use conventional theories from household 
economics. In agricultural households, decisions about the management of the farm are closely 
linked with household decisions on what to eat or how to allocate time between farm work 
and other activities [64]. The farm household operates within a socio-economic and an ecological 
environment. It may have access to natural resources and (functioning) markets and within 
this context the household produces, invests and consumes. Different farm household models 
have been developed over the last century. The theory of Chayanov [65] has been the base of 
many farm household theories [66, 67]. The latter have all altered some of the conditions for 
specific applications, e.g. leaving out market imperfections and trade of labour. 
Ellis [68] describes different farm household models based on objectives, market 
assumptions, predictions and practical effects. One of the special features of the household 
model is the integration of production and consumption decisions of the household. We will 
consider the farm household model of Barnum and Squire [69] as the basis for this study, 
although we make some minor alterations. This household model specifically provides a 
framework for generating predictions on the response of the farm household to a change in 
domestic and market variables. An important reason to use this model is that it, other than the 
Chayanov model, recognises the labour market and thus enables trade of labour between 
different villages. It considers the quantity of land available as fixed and it ignores the 
uncertainties that are part of the production process. These features are comparable to the 
assumptions in our study. G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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Figure 3. Conceptual map of welfare (utility) maximization of the villages. Dashed box indicates 
that the origin of the variable is not shown. Cursive indicates that the variable is altered by the village 
in order to maximise welfare. 
The Barnum and Squire [69] household model also introduces a new product village: the 
Manufacturers. We will not use these in our model. Here, only one type of good will be 
produced which, considering perfect markets, can be traded for other goods. Secondly, the 
model introduces an alternative calculation of utility; which can be considered the driving force 
behind the household model. Barnum and Squire [69] do not only determine the utility by the 
amount of leisure time and consumption, but also by home production. We will not include 
this alteration but consider utility as the amount of leisure time and consumption available. 
An important law when optimizing utility between different sets of products is the law of 
diminishing returns. This leads to a bias towards a leisure seeking behaviour of farmers with 
a high income and an income seeking behaviour of poor farmers. This law will form the basis 
for the choices made when maximum utility. 
Another adaptation we make to the Barnum & Squire [69] model is the inclusion of land 
quality to the production function and writing it into a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with the elements: effective labour, total capital input and current land quality. 
Adaptation & innovation 
Here, we describe what adaptive traits villages have to improve their welfare in response to 
endogenous or exogenous changes. As explained above, we see utility as a measure for welfare. 
In the long-run villages can adapt to a changing social and natural environment by changing 
their knowledge and investments in land quality. They can gain knowledge by investing in 
food or labour by experimenting, imitating and forgetting. Experimenting can yield new 
technologies that can result in higher utility in a specific situation. In the short-run villages 
can adapt to the changing demand or supply of labour and food; by trading with other villages Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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or the world market; robbing; allocating more or less food for capital inputs. Till now, the 
cooperation strategy is directly related to the conflict history (a village will not trade for X 
years with a village that robbed another, known village last year) and the expected utility of 
robbing someone. 
Till now we have not included any kind of game theoretical behaviour, because we assume 
technological learning more important because it directly affects agricultural production. However, 
we plan to introduce more sophisticated game theoretical strategies and game theoretical 
learning during further modelling efforts. Using game theoretical learning agents improve 
their cooperation strategies by repeatedly grappling with interaction processes over time [70]. 
Foresight 
Foresight refers to the way a model represents how agents foresee the future outcomes of 
their decisions. The model uses so-called overt foresight, which means that agents explicitly 
forecast the consequences of each alternative decision. 
The effects of selecting a known technology, doing a conservation investment and robbing a 
trading partner are calculated for two years in advance. Agents assume that their trading 
partner, their own labour input and technology will be the same during two years, but land 
quality, capital and transaction costs change. The latter increase when a village robs its 
trading partner. When assessing trade, agents take into account the conflict history of their 
known villages. The increased risk of conflict is represented by increased transaction costs. 
Agents foresee the effects of technological innovation based on a ceteris paribus increase in 
utility. The foresight of the amount of capital needed for next year is done after harvest and 
with a ceteris paribus assumption of other factors. The effect of the prediction of the second 
year is altered by a discount rate which increases when the nutritional status of a village decreases. 
Sensing 
Sensing is the way an agent based model represents how agents obtain information about 
their (internal and external) environment and neighbouring agents. In line with classic 
economical theory, villages have complete information and awareness of their own 
characteristics and they know the following characteristics of their known villages: location, 
practiced technology, possible trade arrangements and the potential outcome, the piece rate 
when hiring out labour, the conflict history of the villages with other known villages. 
Furthermore they have full information about the characteristics of the area they live on. 
Interaction 
Interactions are mechanisms by which model agents communicate with each other or 
otherwise affect each other. In this model, agents (villages) can trade with each other, steal 
from each other and imitate each other’s technologies. Villages can only interact with villages 
within their social network and with the port. The entire network of agents in the model is a 
small world network. 
A small world network is a connected network with two properties: each node is linked to a 
relatively well-connected set of neighbour nodes; and the presence of short-cut connections 
between some nodes makes the average minimum path length between nodes small. Such 
networks have both local connectivity and global reach. Small world networks are common 
and believed to be an emergent property of many socio-economical transactions [71]. 
As said under sensing, we consider the information to be complete, but subject to the limited 
memory capacity. Within the suitable conditions trade is subject to transaction costs, which G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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are determined by the social and psychological costs of trade. Within societies and especially 
rural societies social norms, trust and social networks are of great importance for economical 
development [72-74]. Transaction costs can be seen as an economic reflection of the state of 
a relationship between two villages. Resulting in the punishment of a wrongdoer by an 
increase in the transaction cost between the wrongdoer and the members of social network to 
which the mistreated village belongs. 
Interaction between agents and their environment 
The effect of agriculture on land quality in Sub Sahara Africa is subject to a long and on-
going debate (e.g. [45]). Within this debate the impact of population growth on land 
degradation and vice versa [75] is of great importance. In the model land degradation is 
proportional to crop production. Villages, however, can choose to diminish the degradation of 
their natural resources by investing in land quality. Agents can foresee the effect of both 
cropping as well as investing in land quality up to two years in advance. 
In the model increased population can both cause land improvement as well as deterioration 
depending on the choices of the villages. 
The production is considered to have impact on the quality of the land as well. We consider 
land degradation as a function of the crop produced, the natural regeneration and investments 
in land quality. 
This on its turn is very much dependent on consumption. Demographical processes determine 
the consumption level of a farm village. It is of importance to consider that an extreme 
decrease of consumption will lead to a decrease of the population. Birth and death rates are 
related to consumption levels. 
Stochasticity 
Stochasticity in agent-based modelling means that pseudo-random numbers are used to 
represent a process or trait. We plan to limit stochastics to a minimum. We will only 
introduce stochastics during initialization when it appears necessary to get things running. 
The selection of a technique as a result of modelling is done using a normal distribution. The 
social networks are created by (uniform) randomly changing connections of a regular square 
lattice network, using a power law distribution till the network shows the characteristics of a 
small world network. 
Collectives 
Villages can choose to cooperate (trade), rob each other or live in autarky. There is however 
no real formation of collectives. Villages interact within their interrelated social networks 
which are imposed. 
Observation 
Observation is the process of collecting data and information from an agent based model. 
Typical observations include graphical display of patterns over space and time and file 
outputs of summary statistics. 
For model testing and calibration we will look at the network structure, which should 
represent a small world phenomenon (described by [76]). For analysis we will look at 
population dynamics, land quality dynamics, welfare development (which includes 
nutritional status and utility), and cooperation dynamics. Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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INITIALIZATION 
During initialization, 10 000 villages and areas are created. Each village is linked to an area. 
The grid has closed boundaries and grid cells have a square shape. Each village is placed in a 
social network: a network of villages with which the village can trade. The networks are 
created in such a way that the entire network is a small world network. A small world network 
means that the path length or the degrees of separation between two villages is never more 
than six. To create a small network we will use the algorithm used by Wats & Strogatz [76]. 
During initialization villages calculate the distance to the other villages in their network. 
Furthermore, they are appointed a certain population and a certain amount of capital that is 
related to the size of the population. Furthermore, they are provided with a brain that holds a 
selection of technologies and a history of conflicts between the villages they know. We try to 
start with a community that is as homogenous as possible. We will only introduce diversity or 
stochastics during initialization when it appears necessary to get things running. 
All areas are given a certain land quality which will be the same for all areas. Later on we 
plan to include some ecological zones using the land quality variable. The zoning will be 
loosely based on the comprehensive analysis on agro-ecosystems in Africa by Dixon et al [77]. 
One of the villages is changed into a port to the world market. By sending labour to the port 
villages can virtually trade with the world market. The price or the amount of food that the 
villages get per amount of labour will be set during the start. All villages have a direct access 
to the world market. 
INPUT 
Two categories of input variables can be distinguished. Those that we are not planning to 
change during model experiments and those that we want to change during model 
experiments. The latter are discussed in the paragraph Simulation experiments. The first 
category includes much of the parameters of table 1. We have not fixed the values of the first 
input category yet, but will do this based on best available knowledge and expert judgement. 
MODEL TESTING & VALIDATION 
The multi-agent model as described above needs empirical testing in the real world. Though 
the model has a bottom-up structure based on theoretical notions of agriculture, ecology, and 
household economics, our outcomes are at an integrated level. Therefore, we will test and 
validate our results using regional insights. 
The more complex interactions will be worked out mostly qualitatively in several case 
studies. Janssen & Ostrom [58] suggest case studies as a suitable method to empirically link 
up multi-agent models with reality. Especially in interdisciplinary research, where causal 
relations between social and environmental variables play a role, they propose qualitative 
case studies. 
We illustrate this here by two projected case studies that focus on two different parts of the 
unsustainability spiral: (i) natural resources: the land quality, population and agricultural 
prices nexus, and (ii) social capital: the trust, migration and agricultural prices nexus. For the 
two other domains of development, technology and demography, a vast amount of empirical 
evidence is already available [10, 78]. For the moment we do not foresee more empirical 
work in these fields. 
Linking up multi-agent modelling with multiple empirical case studies is shown to be a 
powerful tool in integrating research from different fields of study (e.g. [79, 80]). However, G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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as our model does not intend to be a simulation model of real events we will rather test on 
patterns than on exact events. 
LAND DEGRADATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Within the multi-agent model notions are embedded in the nexus between population growth, 
land degradation and low agricultural prices. Recent multi-agent work on less favourable 
areas in Chile and Uganda shows that negative feedbacks exist between these variables [80], 
which have already been quantitatively been expressed in earlier works [10]; [81] on a small 
scale level. However, evidence at higher scale levels (regions) and longer time scales 
(decades) is lacking. 
New research on sedimentation in coral reefs [82] offers great possibilities for extending the 
time and spatial horizon. Fleitmann et al found Ba/Ca records from the Sabaki river, Kenya, 
in coral reefs, that reflect the sedimentation, and hence erosion, history of the past 300 years 
of an aggregate area of more than 60 000 km2. The records show that especially in the last 
100 years, after colonisation, erosion was most severe and erosion peaks are visible in the 
periods between 1930 and 1960, and again from 1975 onwards. These results are irrespective 
of the precipitation variability in these periods and therefore are a result of human 
interference. The results of this study can be linked up with the historical economic and 
demographic development in the Sabaki catchment and, hence, test hypotheses on the 
population, land quality and agricultural prices nexus. 
TRUST AND DEVELOPMENT 
Feedbacks exist between agricultural development, migration and trust. Networks of 
cooperation subsist within villages and between villages. High trust in the agricultural sector, 
in addition, can have positive spill over effect on the non-farm sector. However, positive 
effects of cooperation (e.g. knowledge sharing, cooperatives) can easily dissolve at times of 
resource scarcity or economic hardship. It is hypothesized that problems of social capital 
hamper economic development in Africa [83]. The background of these social capital 
problems needs a better understanding. 
The interactions between trust, agricultural development and migration are hardly researched 
and we project a study on these linkages. Qualitative cultural-historical case studies are 
proposed to find out differences in trust relations between villages and find out the underlying 
causal relationships. We intend to interview farmers on social capital indicators that are a 
result of positive and negative experiences. This involves questions on a.o.: stealing, cheating 
and conflicts; and on: work agreements, economic cooperation and more in general people 
that can be trusted. These images will be linked up with the historical background of the 
villages with its agricultural, economical and demographic developments. Subsequently, 
conclusions can be drawn on the causes of trust as related to independent variables as 
agricultural prices, soil suitability, population density and market vicinity. 
SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
As described in the introduction, the model will be used to test hypotheses on the causes of 
the unsustainability spiral in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 4 for some examples). 
By taking into account the feedbacks, the model provides an integrative setting to study the 
influence of the drivers. Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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Figure 4. Some examples of factors and feedbacks that drive the unsustainability spiral in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. See Figure 2 and design concepts for an overview of the impact of low agricultural prices. 
First of all we will test the hypothesized emergence of the unsustainability spiral (see 
emergence) by simulating a society isolated from the world market, where after we introduce 
a port to the world market with several price regimes. Besides that we will simulate the effect 
of governance by introducing an extra level which represents governmental bodies that can 
build roads (and other infrastructure), supply inputs and facilitate access to capital and spread 
new technologies (agricultural extension). The effect of infrastructure will be simulated by 
altering the transaction cost conversion coefficient. The effects of fertiliser subsidies will be 
simulated by increasing the soil investment coefficient. The effects of policies related to 
improved access to capital (loans, subsidies etc) can be simulated by increasing the capital 
access coefficient. Efforts of agricultural extension can be simulated by providing groups 
(either all or those within a certain distance from the capital) with technologies. 
Furthermore, it is possible to simulate the effect of nepotism by introducing a sort of kinship, 
and provide villages that belong to the clique of the leader preferential access to markets in 
the port city. Subsequently, the effects of land degradation on poverty dynamics will be 
studied by simulating land improvement programmes. This will be done by increasing land 
quality. Additionally, the influence of access to capital will be simulated by changing the 
coefficient that determines access to capital. Finally, the effects of diseases like AIDS will be 
simulated by decreasing the labour intensity coefficient. 
Large scale catastrophic events like the massive slave trade, droughts, floods, form not a 
central part of our vision of the unsustainability spiral. This does not imply, however, that 
these events are unimportant. We will simulate some catastrophes in order to see how robust 
the emerging properties of our model are. In other words: we will use simulated catastrophes 
as a way to test the sensitivity of our model outcomes. 
DISCUSSION 
Models are always wrong and models do not directly improve the yield of the African rural 
population. However, modelling can shine a new light on one of the most serious lock-in G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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situations that our world faces today. Policy makers and scientists often focus too much on 
individual drivers at short time scales, whereas we hypothesise the need for integrated 
research and a long-term view. A multi-scale, multi-driver phenomenon as Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s unsustainability spiral needs a multi-faceted policy approach. We believe that our 
research will offer valuable material to policy makers to make informed decisions on 
development cooperation and trade policy. 
Rather than offering a blue-print like decision support model, that gives the welfare response 
for every change in variable X, we aim at offering a discussion support model that provides 
insights to the scientific and policy making communities on the complex interactions that 
cause the poverty spiral. 
In the model we deliberately used rather conventional economics for describing the choices 
agents can make. We believe the use of conventional economics eases the communication 
with policy makers from governments and international bodies. Conventional methods at 
micro level can create easier acceptance of possible unconventional outcomes at macro scale. 
These outcomes at macro level will also give us a possibility to validate the patterns as found 
in empirical data. 
A major shortcoming of working with theoretical agents is that the decision making 
procedure cannot be validated. However, even when using conventional theories we have to 
note that our model is limited. Firstly, some of our assumptions are hard to test or validate. 
First of all in our model we assume full information. This approach is especially questioned 
within the economic multi-agent modeller society [53]. 
Secondly, in the model we assume that land quality is a linear function of land quality 
investment and production. This appears not to be in line with recent findings of Giller [84] and 
Antle & Stoorvogel [85] who found strong hysteresis in land degradation and regeneration, 
while Giller found great heterogeneity in land characteristics in the fields around villages. 
However, we define land quality as all the characteristics of the area that is occupied by a 
village that influences the marginal capital and labour productivity. Although non-linear 
behaviour in land quality change definitely deserves attention, Antle & Stoorvogel’s and 
Giller’s findings do not provide any evidence that change in land quality shows non-linear 
behaviour as well. 
Thirdly, an important issue is the starting point of the scale level. Although, we use a bottom-
up approach with the lowest scale level being a village of farmers, behaviour of individual 
people is not included in the model. As a consequence individuals’ decision making and 
diversity is not taken into account. 
Finally, it might well be that non-farm production and products, which are currently ignored, play 
a far more important role than expected. Besides that, the use and impact of fertiliser use and 
application can only limitedly be simulated. Furthermore, we excluded many institutional factors 
(although they can be simulated indirectly) like for example property rights and legal equity. 
The model description and proposed simulations and validations are all work in progress. The 
past efforts and planned activities will further promising and novel insights into the unravelling 
of Sub-Saharan Africa’s sustainability spiral and the use of multi-agent methodology. 
APPENDIX 
Here, we describe in some detail the submodels, including the parameterization of the model. Unraveling the unsustainability spiral in sub-Saharan Africa: an agent based modelling approach 
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EVOLVE DEMOGRAPHY 
Calculate Births 
Births are calculated using the following formula: 
  Births = x 
. population 
. maximum_birth_ratio,  (1) 
in which x is calculated by: 
  x = min ( (nutrionStatus – zeroFertilityNutrition)/ maximum fertility nutrition, 1),  (2) 
in which the nutritionStatus is the amount of food per capita (income ⋅ population-1, further 
on for the calculation of income), zeroFertilityNutrition the amount food intake per capita 
when fertility is zero and maximumFertilityNutrition is the level of nutrition after which the 
birth rate does not increase further. 
Deaths 
  population tality minimumMor
tus tritionSta criticalNu
tatus nutritionS tality minimumMor
Deaths ⋅ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ ⋅ −
− = ,
1 (
1 max , (3) 
in which criticalNutritionStatus is the nutrition level from whereon the mortality rate does 
not further decrease, at this nutrition level the mortality will be the minimumMortality. 
EVOLVE KNOWLEDGE 
This consists of the submodules: forget production technology, imitate and experiment. 
Villages can also imitate technology from the villages they know. 
Forget production technology 
First, a village looks whether an experiment has been undertaken in the last year. If so, the 
resulting production technology is stored. After assessing the experiments the stored 
technologies are used. All technologies possess a counter that counts the years that a technology 
was not used. After a number of subsequent years of non-usage a technology is forgotten. 
Imitate production technology 
Villages copy the production technologies used by the villages they know to their list of 
technologies. 
Experiment 
A farmer will experiment if the expected, discounted increase in utility of the found 
technology is higher than a certain threshold: 
  (Discountrate + 1)
-1. U1
 > U0
 + threshold,  (4) 
in which the U1 is the utility when the old technology is used and U0 the utility when the yet 
to be found technology is used. 
 U 1 = U(I1, F) and U0 = U(I0 , F),  (5) 
in which F is leisure and I income which is agricultural production and other income (O), 
which is here constant. Then: 
 I 1 = Y1 + O and I0 = Y0 + O  (6) 
 Y 0 = A0[a0⋅max(0, L – TL0)]
α0⋅[b0⋅max(0, K - TK0)]
β0⋅[c0⋅max(0, P – TP0)]
γ0 (7) 
 Y 1 = A0[a1⋅max(1, L – TL1)]
α1⋅[b1⋅max(1, K - TK1)]
β1⋅[c1⋅max(1, P – TP1)]
γ1   (8) G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek and N.B.J. Koning 
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In which A1,  α1,  β1,  γ1,  TRL1, TRK1, TRP1 are the coefficients that represent the new 
technology, while A0, α0, β0, γ0, TL0, T K0, TP0 is the set of coefficients that represent the 
previous technology. The set of coefficients that forms the new technology is randomly 
selected using a uniform distribution from a pre-composed list of n technologies. The 
selection is done within a certain range to, literally speaking, prevent that an Iron Age 
community suddenly invents a tractor. The threshold is a parameter that is the same for each 
village. For experimenting no additional food or labour is required. The found technology 
will be available to the village the year after the experimenting has been done. 
PLAN PRODUCTION AND EVOLVE COOPERATION STRATEGY 
In the plan production and evolve cooperation strategy module, the village will try to invest 
its resources (food and labour) as effective as possible. This is done by maximizing the 
expected utility (U) which is the sum of this year’s utility (Ut) and the estimated and 
discounted Utility of the following year (Ut+1) 
 U  = Ut + Ut + 1⋅(discountRate + 1)
-1,
  
 U x = Ux(I, F)   
  I = Y
 + tradeResult + robResult – conservationInvestment, 
in which Y is harvest: 
  Y = A[a⋅max (0, L – TL)]
α⋅[b⋅max (0, K – TK)]
β⋅[c⋅max (0, P – TP)]
γ,
 
in which Y is yield or agricultural production, L is labour, K is capital and P is land quality. α, 
β, γ, a, b, c, TL, TK, TP and A are technology dependent variables. Tx is for the threshold value 
of an input x. Before x reaches Tx no production is realised. 
  L = labourIntensity ⋅ (population – outworkers),   
in which labourIntensity is an input variable with a default value of 1. outworkers is the 
number of people from the village who work at another village. Below is explained how this 
number is determined. 
The trade result (tradeResult) is the food paid to the migrant workers of the village minus the 
transaction costs and the wages paid to other villages. Wages of normal villages equal the 
marginal labour productivity of the village that sends the workers. The wage of the port is a 
fixed parameter which represents the world market price. Transaction costs are determined by 
the physical distance to a village and trust. The latter is affected by robbing (see details 
further in the appendix). 
A village can only trade with one of the villages it knows. It can either be an importer of 
labour or an exporter of labour. If a village trades with another village, it might also decide to 
rob the other village. If a village is importer, this is done by not paying the migrant workers 
of the other village. In case a village is an exporter, robbing is done by stealing of food that 
equals the wage of the workers. The robResult is the result of robbing and be robbed. 
First a village calculates the best expected two year income in case it will be self-subsistent 
using the optimal combination of technology, conservation investment (using the consider 
producing submodule). 
Subsequently, each village will search the best combination of send workers, technology, 
conservation investment and robbing for each of the known villages (in the consider trading 
submodule). The best amount of workers sent to the port to the world market (sendWorkers) 
is calculated as follows: 
  sendWorkers = population – L⋅labourIntensity
-1,
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in which L is the labour needed on farm, which is calculated as follows: 
 L  =  ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
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γ β P K A
yCost opportunit
α
, 
in which the opportunityCost is the price of labour at the world market minus transaction 
costs. In this way a village will self-employ workers till the marginal productivity equals 
opportunity costs. From that point onwards, workers are sent to the world market. 
The best possible combination of technology and the amount of conservation investment is 
simply searched by assessing all possible combinations. When trading with a village (which 
is not the world market) the best amount of workers is searched by checking all possibilities 
until the best combination is found. To limit the amount of calculations, conservation 
investment is considered a discrete value. 
Using these best combinations a list is compiled (see Table 2). This list is used to select the 
best trading partner. This best trading partner is invited to trade with the village (the allocate 
inputs submodule). If the trading partner is the world market, the answer will be positive. In 
case the partner is a normal village it will asses its preferential trading partners, which are 
villages that can offer a better trade deal than the deal that is currently on the table. 
Subsequently, it counts for each preferential partner the amount of worse options they have 
than dealing with the village (the village that is offered the deal). The village that is offered 
the deal uses this information to calculate the probability that the village can realise a better 
trade deal, than the one that is offered now. If this change exceeds a certain risk aversion 
threshold the trade offer will be rejected. 
When estimating the income of the second year, the amount of capital and the land quality are 
updated (see the outline of the spend harvest module for more details). So the village can take 
into account the effect of investments in conservation (conservationInvestment). In estimating 
the trade part of the income of the second year the village assumes that it keeps the same 
trading partner. If a village decides to rob from its trading partner, an extra transaction cost 
will be added when trading with any village from the known village list of the robbed village. 
If a partner cannot find a trading partner it will be self sufficient. 
Table 2. Example of a trade outcome list of a village that contains the expected income of trading with 
all known villages at optimal combinations of technique, amount of hired out workers, conservation 
investment and robbing. In this example a village will first try to realize trade with village 2. 
Trade with  Expected  
income 
(food) 
Hired out 
workers (#) 
 
Technique  
Conservation  
investment 
(food) 
Rob? 
(Y/N) 
self (autarky)  200  0  T1  10  NO 
known village 1  300 3  T3  10  YES 
known village 2  400 4  T6  20  NO 
known village 3  200 2  T2  10  NO 
EVOLVE AGRO-ECOLOGY 
GrowCrop 
Crop production is calculated per area using a Cobb Douglas production function: 
 Y  = A⋅max (0, L – TL)
α⋅max(0, K – TK)
β⋅max(0, P – TP)
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In which Y is yield or agricultural production, L is labour, K is capital and P is land quality. α, 
β, γ, TL, TK, TP and A are technology dependent variables. T stands for the threshold value of 
a certain input before it has any effect. 
Evolve LandQuality 
In this submodule the area updates the land quality. Land quality is the sum of the previous 
land quality, regeneration and degeneration with a minimum value and maximum value.  
Regeneration is a constant value. Degeneration is calculated as: 
  Degeneration = crop production – conservation investment⋅conservation efficiency. 
SPEND PRODUCTION 
The villages spend production module consists of a submodule that stores the capital 
(including seed) for next year and a module that sets the discount rate. The amount of capital 
available to the village is chosen in such a way that the sum of the current year’s utility and 
next year’s discounted utility is maximized assuming ceteris paribus of other factors. 
Once the seed is stored a new discount rate is calculated using the following formula: 
 
tatus nutritions
rameter discountPa
te discountRa = ,  
in which the discount parameter has a default value of 100, and the nutrition status is food 
consumption per capita with a minimum of 1,106. The discount rate cannot be higher than 100. 
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RAZVEZIVANJE SPIRALE NEODRŽIVOSTI 
U PODSAHARSKOJ AFRICI: PRISTUP 
MODELIRANJEM POMOĆU AGENATA 
G. van Hofwegen, G.A. Becx, J.A. van den Broek i N.B.J. Koning
 Wageningen International – Sveučilište u Vageningenu 
 Vageningen, Nizozemska 
SAŽETAK 
Podsaharska Afrika zarobljena je u kompleksnu spiralu neodrživosti demografskih, biofizičkih, tehničkih i 
socio-političkih dimenzija. Razvezivanje te spirale nužno je za spoznavanje akcija koje su potrebne za njeno 
invertiranje i podsticanje održivog razvoja. Članak prezentira evolucijski višeagentski okvir koji povezuje 
socioekonomski pristup i svjetsku perspektivu te uzima poljoprivredu kao motor pokretač održivog razvoja u 
podsaharskoj Africi. Razmotreno je više mogćnosti empirijske validacije. 
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